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The design of environmental policy typically takes place within a framework in which uncertainty
over the future impact of pollution and two diﬀerent kinds of irreversibilities interact. The
ﬁrst kind of irreversibility concerns the sunk cost of environmental degradation; the second
is related to the sunk cost of environmental policy. Clearly, the two irreversibilities pull in
opposite directions: policy irreversibility leads to more pollution and a less/later policy while
environmental irreversibility generates less pollution and a more/sooner policy. Using a real
option approach and an inﬁnite time horizon model, this paper considers both irreversibilities
simultaneously. The model ﬁrst is developed by paying particular attention to the option values
related to pollution and policy adoption. Solving the model in closed form then provides solutions
for both the optimal pollution level and the optimal environmental policy timing. Finally, the
model is "calibrated" with the purpose of appraising which irreversibility has the prevailing eﬀect
and what is the overall impact of both irreversibilities on pollution and policy design.
JEL classiﬁcation: Q58, D81.
Keywords : environmental policy, environmental irreversibility, policy irreversibility.1 Introduction
The design of environmental policy typically takes place within a framework in which uncer-
tainty over the future impact of pollution interacts with two diﬀerent kinds of irreversibilities.
This is particularly true for global warming. The impact of increased greenhouse gas (GHG)
concentrations on the world’s climate is uncertain. At the same time, we do not know whether
a given climate change will cause economic damage or, if such damage does occur, the extent
of its impact. Although recent studies have attempted to appraise the cost of controlling GHG
emissions (for example, the Stern review, 2006), these costs remain a source of uncertainty.
Environmental problems involve two kinds of irreversibilities. The ﬁrst pertains to the fact
that damage caused to the environment is at least partly irreversible. Atmospheric concentra-
tions of GHG are, for example, long lasting. Given that increases in temperatures depend on
accumulated amounts of GHG in the atmosphere rather than on current emissions, even a sharp
reduction in GHG emissions will not enable the world economy to instantaneously undo the
damage wrought. Likewise, some evidence suggests that global warming may disrupt natural
processes such as ocean currents and even cause thermohaline circulation to stop (see Keller et
al. (2004)). This, together with the expected rise in seas levels, is a worrying illustration of the
irreversibility of environmental damage.
Two distinct approaches to modelling environmental irreversibility (EI) have emerged in the
literature. Some authors focus on the irreversibility of environmental damage (EI1). In deter-
ministic frameworks, Forster (1975), Tavhonen and Withagen (1996), and Prieur (2008) assess
the irreversibility at play in the pollution accumulation process. An ecosystem’s natural capacity
to assimilate pollution depends on the concentration of the pollutant. A critical threshold exists
above which the assimilation capacity becomes permanently exhausted, thereby implying an ir-
reversible concentration of pollution. In stochastic frameworks, discussion of the irreversibility
of environmental damage appears in Pindyck (2002) and Fisher and Narain (2003), who simply
set the parameter corresponding to the assimilation capacity equal to zero. The second approach
(EI2) to modelling the problem of environmental irreversibility may be found in Kolstad (1996a)
and Ulph and Ulph (1997). Rather than focusing on the irreversibility of environmental dam-
age, these authors consider irreversibility in the decision making process. The basic concept is
that in the presence of environmental externalities, if high levels of emissions result in excessive
environmental damage, the damage cannot be instantaneously undone by reducing the stock
of pollution. The irreversibility is introduced into the model as a non-negativity constraint on
emissions. In this paper, we will focus on this second approach to modelling EI.
The second irreversibility involved in environmental problems, hereafter referred to as policy
irreversibility (PI), is related to the sunk cost (irreversible) nature of most investments made to
reduce GHG emissions. Again, two diﬀerent deﬁnitions of PI may be found in the literature. The
1ﬁrst (PI1) is provided by Kolstad (1996a), who deﬁnes policy irreversibility in terms of abatement
capital durability while abatement investment is costless. The more durable the capital, the more
sunk the policy. Assume, for example, that a ﬁrm decides at some point in time to invest in a
free greener and/or abatement capital in response to a pollution control policy. The ﬁrm will
not be able to remove this investment quickly because it is a long lasting investment. This
implies that current emissions cannot go beyond a certain level because they are constrained by
previous investments devoted to pollution control. Note that an upper boundary on emissions
consequently is imposed, one that is exogenous to ﬁrms, no matter what the optimal level of
production may be. The second deﬁnition of policy irreversibility (PI2), found in Pindyck (2000,
2002) and Fisher and Narain (2003), derives from literature on irreversible investment (Pindyck,
1991). A ﬁrm that invests in abatement capital will not be able to easily resell this capital in
the short term since such an investment exhibits some degree of ﬁrm speciﬁcity. For example,
a coal burning utility cannot uninstall a CO2 scrubber and sell it on a second-hand market
without incurring substantial costs. In other words, if a ﬁrm abates more than is later found to
be optimal because environmental damages prove to be very limited, one cannot easily disinvest
this abatement capital. In the most extreme case, disinvestment is completely impossible and
investments in this kind of abatement capital are then fully irreversible. In this paper, we have
chosen to focus on the second kind of PI because we have doubts concerning the way Kolstad
introduces PI1 in his model. Even with abatement capital installed (lowering the emission-output
ratio), if ﬁrms increase their production suﬃciently, emissions should increase as well.
The two sources of irreversibilities, EI and PI, create a conﬂict in policy recommendations
to control GHG emissions since the two clearly work in opposing directions. Due to uncertainty
over the economic costs of global warming, an economy may prefer to under-invest in pollution
abatement to avoid the sunk cost of taking action. Alternatively, the same uncertainty may be
an incentive for the economy to under-emit today in order to prevent potentially irreversible
damage. In this context, the following questions immediately arise: does either irreversibility
have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on today’s decisions? If both matter, what is the overall impact of
irreversibilities on policymakers’ actions?
Existing studies have focused primarily on the interaction between uncertainty and only one
of the two irreversibilities at a time, not both simultaneously.1 Arrow and Fisher (1974), Henry
(1974), Freixas and Laﬀont (1984), and more recently Gollier and Treich (2003) have shown that
the possibility of obtaining better information in the future about the future beneﬁts and/or
costs of current actions generates a quasi-option value.2 When this value is incorporated in
the decision making process, economic agents should undertake actions that involve a lower
1Most focus on pollution and resource management issues.
2"Quasi-option value" is the formal terminology used in relation to learning and irreversibility (see Kolstad,
1996). However, following the common practice in the literature, we simply use the term "option value" in the
rest of this paper.
2level of irreversible commitment than when no learning has taken place. This is the well-known
irreversibility eﬀect that implies a higher current abatement of pollution in the presence of EI
(Chichilnisky and Heal, 1993).3
More recent analyses have attempted to assess how the two kinds of irreversibilities interact.
Kolstad (1996a) developed a two-period model of global warming in which uncertainty (and
learning) deals with the economic costs of climate change and irreversibilities are deﬁned accord-
ing to the EI2 and PI1 deﬁnitions. In this setting, the author seeks to appraise the consequences
of both irreversibilities on ﬁrst period emissions. In general, it is diﬃcult to draw a conclusion
since the overall impact of the irreversibilities depends on various parameters that include the
decay rate of GHG stocks and the depreciation rate of abatement capital. Numerical simulations
are performed by Kolstad (1996b) in a stochastic model of growth where the same irreversibil-
ities and learning are taken into account. For the parameterization chosen, the non negativity
constraint on emissions (EI2) is never binding, which leads to the following result: uncertainty
and irreversibility call for lower pollution controls and higher emissions. Using the deﬁnitions set
by EI1 and PI2, Fisher and Narain (2003) obtain the same numerical result when both climate
change occurrence and the possible related economic costs are uncertain. Finally, Pindyck (2000,
2002) examines the eﬀect of policy irreversibility as deﬁned by PI2 in an analytical model. En-
vironmental damages are also assumed to be irreversible but again, this irreversibility does not
have an impact in the sense that it does not generate any option value. As expected, Pindyck
shows that the more uncertain the future cost of pollution, the greater is the incentive to wait
rather than immediately adopt a policy. In sum, the literature concludes that by ignoring EI
and PI, traditional cost/beneﬁt analysis is biased toward policy adoption and thereby induces
pollution levels that are unnecessarily low.
This paper attempts to challenge this conclusion by studying the eﬀect of uncertainty and
irreversibilities, as deﬁned by EI2 and PI2, on the optimal level of pollution in a particular
economy. Environmental irreversibility refers to a non-negativity constraint on emissions and
policy irreversibility refers to abatement investment irreversibility. Moreover, the decision to
emit involves a trade-oﬀ. On the one hand, emissions are viewed as a source of beneﬁt since
they enter the production process. On the other, emissions contribute to the accumulation of
pollution which is costly for the economy. Uncertainty deals with the economic costs of pollution.
It encompasses both the uncertainty regarding the exact impact of a given concentration of GHG
and its related economic cost. Using a real option approach and an inﬁnite time horizon model,
this paper focuses ﬁrst on environmental irreversibility. We show that this irreversibility is
associated with an option value to pollute and induces a lower optimal level of pollution. The
more uncertain the evolution of pollution costs borne by the economy, the lower the desired
pollution stock since polluting more now rather than waiting involves a higher opportunity cost.
3Note, however, that Epstein (1980) and Ulph and Ulph (1997) have found situations where this does not hold.
3The second part of the analysis considers the two irreversibilities, EI and PI, together. The
aim is to highlight the two distinct option values related to pollution and policy adoption. Once
a policy is adopted, the study framework is reduced to the optimal pollution problem. What
is more interesting is the situation before a policy is adopted when both irreversibilities play a
role, provided that they work in opposite directions. Considering both irreversibilities prevents
us from reaching an explicit solution. Note in particular that the EI requires comparing ex post
and ex ante marginal value functions while the PI requires comparing ex post and ex ante value
functions. However, solving the model numerically allows us to evaluate which irreversibility has
the prevailing eﬀect and what overall impact both irreversibilities have on pollution and policy
design. The analysis notably stresses the importance of the sunk cost of environmental policy.
If abatement occurs at least cost, then the optimal pollution stock is higher than the one that
would prevail in the absence of irreversibilities. In fact, even if the irreversibility associated
with the pollution decision forces the economy to reduce emissions, this eﬀect is more than
compensated by the opportunity to adopt a policy. In contrast, when environmental policy costs
are suﬃciently high, the option to adopt a policy becomes less attractive. In other words, the
impact of the environmental irreversibility exceeds the impact of policy irreversibility. In this
case, the economy reduces the optimal pollution stock when both irreversibilities are taken into
account. In the calibrated model, the irreversibility associated with the adoption of a pollution
policy prevails and optimal pollution is smaller than in the absence of any irreversibility. Our
conclusion therefore diﬀers sharply from that of existing literature: by ignoring irreversibilities,
one may pollute too much.
Our model is described in the section that follows. The optimization problem ﬁrst is solved
in the presence of the environmental irreversibility alone. The policy irreversibility is added in
Section 3. We calibrate the model and discuss the total eﬀect of both irreversibilities in Section
4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Optimal pollution under environmental irreversibility
2.1 The basic set-up
Pollution Mt accumulates according to the following process:
dMt = (Et − δMt)dt (1)
with Et the amount of emissions at time t, and δ > 0 the natural rate of assimilation. The
stock of pollution may be seen as the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere (GHG,
such as carbon dioxide). Accordingly, emissions Et refer to the anthropogenic emissions of GHG.
Pollution is damaging to the economy. Through the greenhouse eﬀect, emissions accelerate the
rise in global temperatures. According to the IPCC (2007), the expected rise in temperature
4will lie in the range of 1.1−6.4◦C by 2100. Among the most serious economic impacts of global
warming are the multiplication of extreme weather events and the submersion of coastal regions
due to rising oceans levels.
Economic models of climate change (grouped under the name, "integrated assessment mod-
els", such as the DICE model developed by Nordhaus, 1994) usually deﬁne damage as a quadratic
function of the increase in temperature provided that this increase is mainly due to increasing
concentrations of GHG. In this paper, as in Pindyck (2000; 2002), the relationship between eco-
nomic damage and pollution is simpliﬁed by assuming that the former may be directly expressed
as a function of the latter:
C(Mt,θt) = −θtM2
t
where θt, that measures the intensity (or scale) of the impact of pollution, evolves according to
a geometric Brownian motion:
dθt = αθtdt + σθtdzt (2)
Through the formalization of θt, we aim to recognize that many uncertainties bear on the
economic cost of pollution. For instance, uncertainty remains regarding the exact impact of a
given concentration of GHG on temperature. In addition, for a given rise in temperature, it is
diﬃcult to give precise estimations of the economic cost.4 One also should note the possibility
of catastrophic consequences such as the complete shutdown of thermohaline circulation that
would drastically modify appraisals of the impact of climate change.
Choosing an emission level involves the following trade-oﬀ: if emissions contribute to the
accumulation of the pollutant, they also are used as an input in the production sector. The
economic beneﬁts of emissions are represented in the simplest way by considering a linear function
production function, with B > 0,
π(Et) = BEt
thus, the economy’s instantaneous net payoﬀ writes as follows:
C(Mt,θt) + π(Et) = BEt − θtM2
t
Finally, we assume pollution is irreversible, in the sense of Kostad (1996) and Ulph and
Ulph (1997), meaning that the stock of pollution cannot be reduced overnight through negative
emissions. More formally:
Et ￿ 0 (3)
The irreversibility of pollution should be understood as an irreversibility in the decision process.
It has nothing to do with either the irreversibility of pollution accumulation (see notably Tavho-
nen and Withagen, 1996; Prieur, 2008), nor with the irreversibility of environmental damage
related to catastrophic phenomenon.5
4In fact, many studies attempt to estimate these costs (see Tol, 2005 for a survey) but their results diﬀer greatly.
5Consider again the shutdown of thermohaline circulation (Keller et al., 2004).
52.2 The central planner program
The central planner objective is to determine the emission policy that maximizes the expected




   +∞
0
e−ρt [C(θt,Mt) + π(Et)]dt
 
(4)
with ρ > 0, the discount rate.
This optimization problem looks like a traditional irreversible decision problem (Pindyck,
1988; Abel and Eberly, 1994). Using standard techniques, it is possible to show that the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation associated with the optimization problem (4) is:








where the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the maximization are:
VM(θt,Mt) ≤ 1,Et ≥ 0,[VM(θt,Mt) + B]Et = 0,∀t ≥ 0.
The left-hand side (LHS) of equation (5) reﬂects the required rate of return. The right-hand
side (RHS) is the expected change in the value in the region for the state variable θ where there
are no emissions i.e. in the continuation region. Equation (5) holds identically in M. Therefore,
the partial derivative of the LHS with respect to M equals the partial derivative of the RHS with
respect to M. Performing this diﬀerentiation yields:
ρVM(θt,Mt) =
 




We deﬁne φt = 1/θt for ease of presentation. It implies that the higher the intensity of
pollution damage, the smaller φt. As a result of this new notation, the instantaneous proﬁt
function becomes homogenous of degree one in φ and M. Moreover, we can deduce using Itô’s
lemma that φ follows a geometric Brownian motion:
dφt = (σ2 − α)φtdt − σφtdzt
⇔ dφt = µφtdt − σφtdzt with µ = σ2 − α
To solve equation (6), we use the fact that since the instantaneous payoﬀs are homogeneous
of degree one in φ and M, the value function V is homogeneous of degree one in φ and M. This
property of the value function implies that the marginal valuation of pollution VM is homogeneous
of degree zero in φ and M and, hence, can be written simply as a function of yt; the ratio of Mt
6to φt. This ratio increases with both the pollution stock Mt and the pollution intensity θt. We
deﬁne the marginal valuation of pollution by:
q(yt) = VM(φt,Mt)
Diﬀerentiating this equation and using the deﬁnition of y yields expressions for the partial
derivatives of the value-function. Substituting the deﬁnition of q(y) and its partial derivatives in
equation ((6)) yields the following diﬀerential equation for the marginal valuation of pollution
q(y):





The optimization problem (4) can be solved using this diﬀerential equation and appropriate





The marginal value of pollution is then:
q(y) =
−2
ρ + 2δ + µ − σ2y + Ay−β2 ↔ q(y) =
−2
ρ + 2δ − α
y + Ay−β2
with β2 the positive root of the fundamental quadratic equation. Ay−β2 is the option to pollute
more in the future where A is a constant to be determined.
The central planner exercises the emission option when the state variable y becomes low
enough to reach a trigger value y∗. Let E be the amount of emission used. Pollution then
increases by a marginal amount dM and the economy beneﬁts from BE. This generates the
following condition:
V (φ,M) = V (φ,M + dM) + BE
Dividing by the increment dM, this condition can be written as follows:
q(y∗) = −B
To ensure that investment occurs along the optimal path, we also require the smooth pasting
condition to be satisﬁed:
q′(y∗) = 0










⇔ M∗ = φ


















The larger the natural assimilation rate δ, the higher the desired level of pollution. Obviously;
the larger the return on emissions (B) or the lower the intensity of pollution (1/φ), the larger
the desired level of pollution.
Ignoring the joint eﬀect of uncertainty and irreversibility by simply applying a standard NPV
rule, the desired pollution would be:
M∗
NI = φ













< 1 , the pollution irreversibility leads to a smaller desired level of pollution.
Note that the optimal level of pollution does not correspond to the desired one when the real-
izations of the stochastic variable φ (resp. θ) happen to decrease (resp. increase) in time. This
means that the economy may be stuck with too much pollution given the current realization of
the stochastic variable.
Uncertainty aﬀects y∗ and M∗
t = φt/y∗ through the ratio involving β2. The eﬀect highlights
the impact of the irreversibility of pollution on optimal decisions. It plays through the ratio
involving β2. For a given φ, an increase in σ, by reducing β2, is accompanied by a decrease
in M∗: the more uncertain the evolution of pollution costs to be borne by the economy, the
lower the desired pollution stock. Polluting more now rather than waiting involves a higher
opportunity cost. In other words, due to the irreversibility and the increasing uncertainty, the
economy will pollute less.
3 Policy design under environmental and policy irreversibilities
In this section, we will consider pollution irreversibility together with policy irreversibility. By
dealing with the two irreversibilities at the same time, the aim is on the one hand to stress their
respective impact on decision making and, on the other, to understand which one prevails pro-
vided they play in opposite directions. Following an adaptation of Pindyck’s approach (2000), the
policy intervention consists of a once-and-for-all reduction in Mt. The policy is the opportunity
to reduce pollution from its current level to its desired level and involves a sunk cost for society.
Such a policy becomes of interest when sensitivity to pollution becomes too high given the stock
of pollution. The policy cost, K.Mt, is assumed to be increasing in the stock of pollution at the
moment of policy adoption. The value of the central planner program is now:
V D ≡ max
{Et}, ˜ T
Et
   +∞
0
e−ρt [C(θt,Mt) + π(Et)]dt + [C(θ ˜ T,M∗
˜ T) + π(E˜ T) − KM˜ T]e−ρ ˜ T
 
,
8subject to (1), (2) with ˜ T the random time when the adoption occurs. V D(θt,Mt) denotes the
value function in the "dirty" region, i.e. before adoption; M∗
˜ T is the desired level of pollution at
the adoption time.
This program combines:
• the optimal investment problem, laid out in section 1, that gives the desired pollution
stock, and
• an optimal stopping problem that determines when it is optimal to spend KMt to reduce
Mt to its desired level.
We note MD∗ the desired level of pollution in the "dirty" economy i.e. before policy adoption
and MC∗ the desired level in the "clean" economy i.e. after adoption.The resolution still mobilizes
the tools of dynamic programming and requires the problem to be decomposed into two parts
depending on whether or not the policy has been adopted.
3.1 Optimal pollution when the policy is adopted
The problem is formally similar to the one studied in section 1. Let us deﬁne V C(θt,Mt) as
the value function for the "clean" region where MC∗
t is the desired stock of pollution after the
adoption of a policy. The value function V C(θt,Mt) must satisfy the Bellman equation:
ρV C(θt,Mt) = C(θt,Mt) − δMtV C






Recall that yt = Mtθt and qC(y) = V C
M(φt,Mt). The similarity with the problem in section 1
allows us to deduce:
qC(y) =
−2







where the term A
′





















For the remainder of the analysis, it is useful to derive from (10) the expression of the value
function V C(φt,Mt). Integrating V C
M(φt,Mt) between the appropriate boundaries provides the
solution:
V C(φt,Mt) = −
1











The next section deals with the case where both irreversible decisions must be taken.
93.2 Optimal pollution and optimal adoption
Let us denote V D(Mt,θt) and qD(yt) the value function and the marginal valuation of pollution
in the "dirty" region i.e. before the adoption of a policy. Then, by making use of the same
techniques as before, it is easy to show that qD(yt) admits the following general form:
q(y) =
−2
ρ + 2δ − α
y + A1 (y)
−β1 + A2 (y)
−β2
with β1 < 0 and β2 > 1, A1,A2 > 0.
The marginal valuation of pollution exhibits an additional term A1
 
yD −β1 that is the second
option value related to policy adoption. A2 (y)
−β2 is the option value related to pollution, which
also exists after policy adoption. Assume θ → 0, which means that the cost of pollution is almost
nil, then the option to adopt the policy becomes negligible. This is precisely the basic property
conveyed by the term A1 (y)





The associated value function writes:
V D(φt,Mt) = −
1














Four optimality conditions must be considered:





that provide MD∗(φ) and A2
• the two conditions for the optimal stopping problem:
V D(φ∗,M) = V C(φ∗,MC∗) − KM
V D
φ (φ∗,M) = V C
φ (φ∗,MC∗)
 
that provide φ∗(M) and A1
Thus, we are left with a system of four equations (with χ = (ρ + 2δ + µ + σ2)−1):

      
      
−2χθMD∗ + A1
 
θMD∗ −β1 + A2
 
θMD∗ −β2 = −B
−2χ
 
θMD∗ 2 + A1β1
 
θMD∗ 1−β1 + A2β2
 


































with four unknowns: MC∗, A2, θ∗ and A1. These optimality conditions become more tractable
when rewritten in terms of yD and yC. In fact, the following logic applies:
10• Let ya∗ be the trigger value at which the policy option is exercised. The value ya∗ is the
ﬁrst unknown (corresponding to φ∗)
• The policy adoption allows the economy to "jump" to the post-adoption desired - and
known - level yC∗
• As for the emission decision, let us denote yD∗ the trigger level at which the option to
pollute is exercised (i.e. the desired level before policy adoption). yD∗ is the second
unknown to be determined.
The last two unknowns remain A1 and A2, that provide the option values (i) to adopt the
environmental policy and (ii) to pollute more.










The system of optimality conditions is:

     




















yD∗ −β1 + A2
1−β2
 









yD∗ 1−β2 = 0


















Due to the non linearities, this system cannot be solved analytically.
114 Numerical resolution
Based on a numerical resolution, we assess the impact of the striking parameters on optimal
decisions.
4.1 Calibration
Numerical resolution is performed by making use of the following set of baseline parameters:
{K,δ,ρ,α,B,σ} = {27.28,0.005,0.05,0.03,7.14,0.2}
Parameter K, corresponding to the abatement cost per metric ton of CO2, is drawn from the
2007 DICE model (Nordhaus, 2008). It refers to the carbon tax induced by the optimal policy.6
for 2005, expressed in 2005 US $ per metric ton. The value for δ is the one reported by most
climate change experts in surveys (see Pindyck, 2002). As for the discount rate, the value we set
is close to what most western governments use for most long term investments (see Tol, 2005).
Parameter α is chosen to account for the positive dependence of environmental concerns with
respect to wealth. We interpret this relationship by setting the trend in intensity of damage equal
to the mean economic growth rate in developed countries. Such an intensity might grow faster
and could be mitigated by adaptation; in the absence of precise information about these two
eﬀects, our choice seems a reasonable ﬁrst approximation. Parameter B reﬂects the beneﬁts per
unit of emissions. It is approximated using the (inverse of the) CO2 emissions to GDP ratio in
metric tons carbon per constant $, as provided by the 2007 DICE model. The size of uncertainty
is largely undetermined and has been chosen as large as possible provided that the existence
conditions deﬁne an upper boundary for σ.
4.2 Eﬀect of uncertainty
Both thresholds yD∗ = θMD∗ and yC∗ = θMC∗ providing the desired pollution levels before
and after policy adoption are monotonically decreasing in σ, as shown by Figure 2. This means
that the higher the uncertainty, the smaller the pollution for a given value of the stochastic
variable θ. In contrast, the threshold ya∗ governing policy adoption monotonically increases with
uncertainty. Therefore, for a given amount of pollution, the larger the uncertainty, the later the
policy is adopted. Since the value before adoption V D and the value after adoption V C both
increase with uncertainty, the total eﬀect on policy adoption is a priori ambiguous.
6In the 2007 DICE model, the optimal policy is deﬁned as the emissions trajectory that balances current
abatement costs against future damage from global warming.








































4.3 Eﬀect of irreversibilities
In order the gain insight into the respective eﬀects of both irreversibilities, we compare the
respective evolution of the yD∗, which encompasses the two options, and y∗
NI, deﬁned as the
trigger value when ignoring the joint eﬀect of irreversibility and uncertainty (see equation (8)).
For low levels of environmental policy cost, we observe yD∗ > y∗
NI, or equivalently, MD∗ > M∗
NI
for a given realization of θ. The eﬀect of the opportunity to adopt a policy prevails on the
eﬀect of the irreversibility associated with the pollution, leading to more pollution than when
irreversibility is ignored.
In contrast, it appears that for high levels of environmental policy cost, yD∗ < y∗
NI, or equiv-
alently, MD∗ < M∗
NI. This means that the impact of the pollution irreversibility exceeds the
impact of the policy irreversibility. In this case, the economy pollutes less when both irreversibil-
ities are taken into account. For an inﬁnite level of K the economy never adopts the policy, thus
yD∗ tends towards yC∗.
When comparing Figures 2 and 3, it is clear that it is only for a particular level of abatement
cost (around K = 10) that the eﬀect of both irreversibilities perfectly oﬀset each other. In such
a case yD∗ = y∗
NI and it is not misleading to ignore the two irreversibilities. Considering the
calibrated level of the abatement costs, namely K = 27.28, we therefore ﬁnd that the optimal
pollution level for a given realization of θ is smaller than the level that would prevail if both
13irreversibilities were ignored. In other words, by not considering pollution irreversibility and
policy irreversibility, one may pollute too much. This is a striking result compared to the
ﬁndings of other studies attempting to introduce the two irreversibilities (Kolstad, 1996; Fisher
and Narain, 2003; Pindyck, 2000, 2002). Because these papers only take the policy irreversibility
into eﬀective account, their conclusions are that introducing irreversibility should lead to more
pollution.
Our results probably would be weakened by allowing policy adoption to occur more than
once since pollution would then become less problematic. Nevertheless, our results seem robust
in the sense that, assuming a once-and-for-all policy, a policy cost valued at less than half the
one we calibrated (from K = 27.28 to K = 10) is needed to reverse them.






















In this paper we deal simultaneously with the two irreversibilities that characterize pollution
issues, namely the sunk cost of environmental policy and the sunk cost of environmental degra-
dation. The ﬁrst part of the paper concentrates on pollution irreversibility alone. We ﬁnd
that such an irreversibility generates a lower level of pollution when the damage of pollution is
uncertain. Adding the environmental policy irreversibility leads to a situation where the two
irreversibilities work in opposite directions. Solving the model provides implicit solutions for
both the optimal pollution level and the optimal timing of environmental policy adoption. With
the calibration, we ﬁnd that the irreversibility associated with the adoption of a pollution pol-
icy prevails and optimal pollution is smaller than in the absence of any irreversibility. Further
research will focus on the explicit modelling of the diﬀerent sources of uncertainty. This should
involve ﬁrst decomposing uncertainty on the pollution-climate relationship and uncertainty on
the climate-economic costs relationship. Second, uncertainty on the environmental policy should
be introduced. Finally, the problem of optimal pollution under uncertainty and irreversibilities
probably should be considered in a general equilibrium framework, therefore explicitly taking
into account the consumption/environmental arbitrage.
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